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Testing for Asymmetries in the Preferences of the Euro-Area Monetary 
Policymaker 
 
Alvaro Aguiar and Manuel M. F. Martins 
CEMPRE*, Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto 
First version: July 2005 
This version: November 2005 
 
Abstract 
This paper tests for asymmetries in the preferences of the Euro-Area monetary 
policymaker with 1995:I-2005:II data from the latest update of the ECB's Area-wide database. 
Following the relevant literature, we distinguish between three types of asymmetry: 
precautionary demand for expansions, precautionary demand for price stability and interest 
rate smoothing asymmetry. Based on the joint GMM estimation of the Euler equation of 
optimal policy and the AS-AD structure of the macroeconomy, we find evidence of 
precautionary demand for price stability in the preferences revealed by the monetary 
policymaker. This type of asymmetry is consistent with the ECB’s definition of price stability 
and with the priority of credibility-building by a recently created monetary authority. 
 
Keywords: Central Bank Preferences, Asymmetry, Euro Area, Optimal Control, GMM. 
JEL classification: E52, E58, C32. 
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1. Introduction1
The purpose of this paper is to formally examine whether there is significant evidence 
of asymmetries in the revealed preferences of the Euro Area monetary policymaker. 
Most of the empirical analysis of monetary policy preferences has modeled the 
preferences of the policymaker as a symmetric quadratic loss function. Within that 
framework, Aguiar and Martins (2005), following an approach similar to Favero and 
Rovellis’ (2003) study of the US case, have found that the aggregate Euro Area data 
uncover the existence of a well-defined monetary policy regime of strict inflation 
targeting with interest rate smoothing during 1995:I-2002:IV. 
However, the hypothesis that the coefficients of policymakers’ loss functions may 
not be identical across different states of the macroeconomy is receiving a growing 
interest in the literature. On one hand, Cukierman (2000, 2002) has suggested that 
credible central banks may have a precautionary demand for expansions, i.e., would 
rather have a positive than a negative output gap given a particular inflation level. On 
the other hand, Goodhart (1998) has argued that central banks with a need to build 
credibility may have a precautionary demand for price stability, i.e., would rather have 
inflation below than above the target, everything else equal. 
Although discrimination between symmetry and asymmetry would clearly 
improve the knowledge about the preferences of monetary policymakers, examples of 
formal loss-function asymmetry tests do not abound in the literature. Most studies have 
tested for asymmetries in policy reaction functions, which, as reduced forms, are 
uninformative about the (structural) parameters of the loss function; while others have 
tested loss function asymmetry proper, but in the context of static or purely forward-
looking macro structures, which are not data consistent. 
In this paper we relax the assumption of a symmetric quadratic policymaker loss 
function, allowing and testing for different coefficients across cyclical states of the 
economy, in a framework that encompasses the standard symmetric case. The baseline 
model consists of an aggregate demand-aggregate supply (AD-AS) macroeconomic 
structure and an Euler equation for optimal discretionary policy. The three equations are 
jointly estimated by the generalized method of moments (GMM), using the relevant 
cross-equation restrictions and the pre-defined policy targets. Among the estimates, we 
focus on the varying parameters of the loss function in order to conduct formal tests of 
asymmetry. 
 
1 We thank Fabio Canova’s comments and suggestions to an earlier version of this paper. The usual 
disclaimer applies. 
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The evidence is based on a sample beginning in 1995:I, a date that we - based on 
the record of European macroeconomic and monetary integration - assume as the 
beginning of a well-defined (although not formally until 1999:I) monetary policy 
regime in the aggregate Euro Area. The aggregate Euro Area data - quarterly 1995:I-
2005:II - is mostly from the last update of the European Central Bank’s Area Wide 
Model Database (AWM12up5) available since August 20042. Regarding the output gap, 
we use a quasi-real-time output gap, in contrast with the ex-post measures often used in 
monetary policy analysis, as an attempt to approach the real-time data available to 
policymakers at the time of policy decisions. 
The main result is that there is statistically significant evidence that the Euro Area 
monetary policymaker has had a precautionary demand for price stability during 1995-
2005. This seems consistent with the fact that during the main part of this period a 
crucial task for the Euro-Area monetary policymaker - first a notional policymaker 
ahead of the EMU, throughout 1995-1998, and then the European Central Bank (ECB) 
proper, starting in 1999 - has been to establish its (anti-inflationary) credibility. 
The rest of the paper is outlined as follows: In section 2 we briefly review the 
literature and recent empirical results on asymmetries of monetary policy preferences; 
then, in section 3, we present our model and econometric strategy; section 4 describes 
the data and discusses the empirical results, and section 5 shows some sensitivity 
checks; finally, section 6 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2. The case for Asymmetric Monetary Policymaker’s Preferences 
In this section we review the recent literature and main empirical results on asymmetric 
loss functions, and present the specific motivations for testing this asymmetry regarding 
the Euro Area policymaker. 
Conventionally, policymakers’ preferences have been modeled with symmetric 
quadratic loss functions, in which the same weights are attached to equally sized 
positive and negative deviations of the goal variables from their targets. Motivations for 
this assumption include plausibility, analytical tractability and clearness of the results. 
Yet, the hypothesis that the preferences of monetary policymakers may be asymmetric 
has received a lot of interest in two currents of the literature. 
In the first current, Cukierman (2000, 2002) has argued that even though central 
bankers dislike deviations of inflation from the target as well as negative output gaps, 
for a given level of inflation they do not have interest in offsetting positive output gaps. 
 
2 We thank Elvira Rosati, of the ECB, for providing this latest version of the AWMD. 
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The claim is that the political establishment is sensitive to the social costs of recessions, 
and that in democratic societies even independent and accountable central banks are not 
completely insensitive to social and political pressures. This hypothesis has practical 
appeal in as much as it seems consistent with many insiders’ descriptions of policy, 
such as Blinder’s (1998, p. 19-20) much cited: “In most situations the CB will take far 
more political heat when it tightens preemptively to avoid higher inflation than when it 
easies preemptively to avoid higher unemployment”. Moreover, it has the theoretical 
appeal of offering an explanation for the inflationary bias in the monetary policy of the 
1960s and 1970s that does not hinge on the Kydland-Prescott/Barro-Gordon (KP/BG) 
assumption that policymakers target output above its natural level. In fact, a 
policymaker with a loss function featuring Cukierman’s asymmetry would tackle the 
uncertainty of policymaking choosing rather to err on the side of ease than on the side 
of tightening, i.e., it would have a precautionary demand for expansions – see Gerlach 
(2003) for a formal analysis, and Ruge-Murcia (2003a) and Cukierman and Gerlach 
(2003) for reduced-form tests of this hypothesis applied, respectively, to the US and 21 
OECD countries. 
In the second current of the literature, Goodhart (1998) has remarked that a 
policymaker trying to establish its credibility as an inflation fighter would react to 
uncertainty preferring negative rather than positive deviations from the inflation target. 
In this case, the policymaker would have a precautionary demand for price stability, 
from which a deflationary bias would arise. This type of bias that had been mentioned 
before by Fischer (1994) in the context of the creation of a new commitment to low 
inflation by developed countries during the 1980s. In such contexts of credibility 
buildup, the hypothesis of precautionary demand for price stability seems plausible, and 
could improve the quadratic functions as a description of the preferences of 
policymakers - see Ruge-Murcia (2003b) for an indirect test of this hypothesis for 
Sweden, Canada and the UK. Goodhart (1998) notes that, as inflation is typically a pro-
cyclical variable, this precautionary demand for price stability may offset Cukierman’s 
precautionary demand for expansions. 
Given these two conflicting hypothesis about the nature of the possible asymmetry 
in central banks’ preferences, several researchers undertook the approach of testing for 
asymmetry encompassing both precautionary demands – for expansions and for price 
stability. Most of this research has focused on the estimation of non-linear policy 
reaction functions (for a variety of samples and with a variety of non-linear 
specifications) exploiting the well-known result that if an asymmetry in central bank 
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preferences exists, then the optimal policy rule is non-linear – see Bec et al. (2002), 
Kim et al. (2005), Cukierman and Muscatelli (2002), Martin and Milas (2004), 
Karagedikli and Lees (2004), and Bruinshoofd and Candelon (2005). 
However, evidence of non-linearity in policy reaction functions may be ultimately 
uninformative about the asymmetry of the policymaker’s loss function. The reason is 
that policy reaction coefficients, as complex convolutions of the structural parameters, 
do not reveal the policymaker’s preferences. Dealing with this issue requires the 
specification of a structural model of the economy so as to uncover the coefficients of 
the policymaker’s loss function. 
Examples of this structural approach are much more scarce, however, and seem 
limited to Dolado et al. (2004) and Surico (2003, 2004). Dolado et al. (2004) have 
shown that an asymmetric loss function of the linex functional form and a 
macroeconomic structure of the Rudebusch-Svensson type (Rudebusch and Svensson, 
1999, 2002) generate an optimal policy reaction function that includes the conditional 
variance of inflation in addition to the standard reaction function regressors. With this 
setup, they found evidence of precautionary demand for price stability in the US only 
after 1983. Surico (2003, 2004) shows that the analytical solution of the policymaker 
optimization problem with a loss function with linex forms in both inflation and the gap, 
under a forward-looking AD-AS structure, results in an interest rate rule that includes 
the square of the output gap and of inflation deviations from target, and devised tests on 
its coefficients that allow for inference on the loss function non-linearity. While Surico 
(2003) finds that monthly Euro Area data for 1997:7-2002:10 reveals a precautionary 
demand for expansions, Surico (2004) finds a precautionary demand for expansions in 
the US monetary policy before 1979 and no sign of any asymmetry thereafter. 
Both these studies seem to have some drawbacks, however. Dolado et al. (2004) 
have to restrict their policymaker loss function to a regime of strict inflation targeting 
and thus are not able to test for Cukierman’s asymmetry. Moreover, their econometric 
strategy is not a truly simultaneous estimation of the macro system, as the conditional 
variance of inflation included in the optimal policy reaction function is generated in a 
first step prior to the rule estimation. In turn, Surico (2003, 2004) models the AS-AD 
structure of the economy with purely forward-looking equations and with instantaneous 
transmission of interest rate changes to output and inflation. The resulting lack of 
persistence and of policy lags implies that his model is not data-consistent. Due to these 
problems, it is hard to assess whether Dolado et al.’s and Surico’s empirical results in 
the US case are incompatible or complementary. 
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While the literature of formal analysis of central bank preferences’ asymmetry, 
just briefly reviewed, exposes the need for methodological contributions, it also reveals 
that the Euro Area case has barely been studied to date – the only exception being 
Surico (2003). Yet, there are at least two compelling motivations for a study of the 
possible asymmetry in the preferences of the aggregate Euro Area monetary 
policymaker. 
The first motivation is the ECB’s own definition of price stability as “a year on 
year increase in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices for the Euro Area below 2 
percent” (ECB, 2004, p.50), further clarified in the May 2003 statement that the ECB 
“aims to maintain inflation rates below but close to 2 percent over the medium term” 
(ECB, 2004, p. 51). This can be interpreted as an indication of asymmetric preferences, 
in the sense that 2 percent annual inflation is the ceiling consistent with price stability, 
with negative deviations from that limit preferred to positive deviations. 
Second, the fact that the ECB has been created very recently may offer good 
substance for a case-study. In fact, the study of a new policymaker of a new monetary 
area is an exceptional opportunity to assess the plausibility of Goodhart’s hypothesis 
that central banks engaged in the establishment of its credibility are prone to have a 
precautionary demand for price stability. From this point of view, Surico’s (2003) 
evidence of a precautionary demand for expansions by the Euro Area policymaker 
between 1997 and 2002 is quite surprising. 
We contribute to this literature with new evidence of the revealed preferences of 
the Euro-Area monetary policymaker. In view of the small-sample econometric 
difficulties in testing for varying policymaker’s preference parameters with quarterly 
data starting in 1999, we stretch our sample back to 1995, thus adding a period of a 
notional Euro-Area policymaker ahead of the EMU (1995-1998) to the period of actual 
ECB policymaking (1999-2005). The extension of the estimation period back to 1995 is 
grounded on Aguiar and Martins’ (2005) analysis that within the time span between the 
EMU Treaty (1992) and the actual monetary union, the evidence points to a well-
defined aggregate monetary policy regime since 1995.3 Yet, in section 5 below we 
inspect the sensitivity of the results to deviations from this sample period, including a 
shorter sample closer to the formal ECB era. 
 
3 In addition to reviewing the main European integration facts and the literature on the convergence of 
cycles in the EMU countries, Aguiar and Martins (2005) present econometric evidence of structural 
stability of an aggregate Euro-Area AS-AD system and of an aggregate policymaker’s loss function 
coefficients since 1995. 
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The evidence is extracted using a framework that allows for testing the relevant 
asymmetries in the central bank loss function, given a data-consistent macroeconomic 
structure. The basis is Aguiar and Martins’ (2005) GMM simultaneous estimation of an 
AS-AD macroeconomic structure with the policymaker’s Euler equation, which is 
modified to allow for non-linearities in the Euler equation. Such non-linearities are 
clearly identified with asymmetries in the policymaker’s loss function. In doing so, we 
are able to identify and, thus, retrieve the coefficients of the policymaker’s preferences 
and of the macroeconomic structure (assumed to be linear). In addition to discriminating 
between precautionary demand for expansions and precautionary demand for price 
stability, the framework may also detect asymmetry in interest rate smoothing. This 
third type of asymmetry in preferences, although unexamined to date, is implicit in 
Goodhart’s (1997) contention that because interest rate increases are normally seen as 
bad news while decreases are seen as good news, central bankers may tend to decrease 
rates smoothly and to increase them less frequently and in larger increments. 
 
3. A framework for testing for asymmetries in the preferences of the 
monetary policymaker 
This section presents the model and the econometric strategy for testing for 
asymmetries in the policymaker’s preferences. 
The model consists of an aggregate supply-aggregate demand (AS-AD) 
macroeconomic structure and a loss function describing the policy-maker’s preferences. 
In view of the generally recognized data-inconsistency of the dynamics of purely 
forward-looking specifications (documented by Estrella and Fuhrer (2002), for 
example) and considering the difficulties in identifying and estimating hybrid 
specifications with a small sample, we assume a simple AS-AD system of the 
Rudebusch and Svensson (1999, 2002) class. Versions of this type of macroeconomic 
structure have been profusely used in recent studies of monetary policy, including, for 
European countries, Taylor (1999) and Dolado et al. (2005). According to Rudebusch 
and Svensson (2002, pp. 421-422), their dynamic backward-looking AS-AD model is 
motivated by its “…congruence with actual central bank models, and empirical fit to the 
data.” and it “…also appears to roughly capture the views about the dynamics of the 
economy held by many monetary policymakers.” 
We adopt the following version of the Rudebusch-Svensson model identified 
empirically with Euro-Area data by Aguiar and Martins (2005): 
Page 8 of 29
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
8



++++++=
++++=


.)1(
)(
1984765372615
334332211
AS
tttttttt
AD
ttttttt
Icyccccccc
icycycycy


(1)
The first equation - the aggregate demand (AD) - links the output gap, y, to its past 
and to the real interest rate, i-. The second equation - the aggregate supply (AS) - 
relates inflation, , to its lags, to the output gap, and to the lagged difference between 
imported and domestic inflation, I. The innovations ADt and 
AS
t are assumed to be 
iid normal with zero expected value. The AS equation is a version of the well known 
Gordon's Phillips relation, the triangle model of inflation explaining price dynamics 
with three basic elements - expectations and inertia, demand pressure and supply 
shocks. Dynamic homogeneity is imposed on the coefficients on lagged inflation, as the 
data does not reject that hypothesis in unconstrained estimation, with the advantage of 
reducing the number of coefficients to estimate and of complying with the natural rate 
hypothesis. As argued in more detail in Aguiar and Martins (2005), this model implies a 
dynamic behavior of the economy and a transmission of monetary policy consistent 
with the evidence in several studies of the aggregate Euro Area. 
Following standard assumptions in the empirical literature of monetary policy, the 
policymaker’s preferences are modeled as an inter-temporal loss functional in which, at 
each period, the loss function depends on the square of the deviations of inflation and 
the output gap from desired levels (* and zero, respectively) as well as on the square of 
the change in the interest rate (reflecting interest rate smoothing). Future values are 
discounted at rate 	, and the weights 
 , , and µ are nonnegative. Assuming a 
discretionary policy regime, for the sake of realism and estimation feasibility, the 
optimization problem solved by the central banker is a closed-loop system. At each 
period, given the observed state of the economy, the policymaker chooses the value for 
the policy control variable - the interest rate i - that minimizes the loss functional, 
subject to the dynamic structure of the economy, 
 [ ]2122
0
)(*)(
2
1
++++

=
++ 

 µ
	 ttttt
i
iiyEMin
t
(2)
subject to system (1), t .
Asymmetry in the policymaker’s preferences means that the structural weights 
 ,
, and µ depend on the appropriate state of the economy. Restricting these functions to 
simple threshold (bilinear) models, the types of asymmetric preferences suggested in the 
literature may be written as follows, reflecting (i) Cukierman’s (2000) precautionary 
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demand for expansions, (ii) Goodhart’s (1998) precautionary demand for price stability 
and (iii) Goodhart’s (1997) interest rate smoothing asymmetry: 
[ ] [ ]0000 1|1| << ++++ ×+×=   tttt yyyy
[ ] [ ]**** 1|1|   


 << ++++ ×+×= tttt
[ ] [ ]0000 1|1| << ++++ ×+×=  µµµ tttt iiii
(3)
where [ ].1 is a Heaviside function that equals one if the argument-condition holds and 
zero otherwise. Under (3), the loss function turns into a threshold quadratic function in 
which the weights associated with the squared deviations of each goal-variable from its 
desired level are allowed to switch when each goal-variable is expected to be above or 
below its desired level. The modified policymaker’s optimization problem is, then, 
[ ] [ ]( )[
[ ] [ ]( )
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s.t. system (1), t .
For example, if the policymaker has a precautionary demand for expansions, then 
00 || < ++ <   tt yy , and interest rates are changed - at moment t - more (less) 
aggressively when the expected output gap - at moment t+ - is negative (positive), for 
the same size of deviation from zero. 
This specification encompasses the symmetric case, in which the weights 
 , ,
and µ, are constant. In addition, it is flexible enough to allow for testing asymmetry of 
the loss function weights simultaneously or individually, thus permitting a clarification 
of the origin of the possible asymmetry. The choice of a bilinear model is aimed at 
keeping the loss function and the corresponding Euler equation as simple as possible; 
this seems reasonable in view of the limited data and of the lack of a-priori information 
about the functional form of the possible asymmetry.4
The Euler equation for this problem is the following expression describing the 
optimal path for the policy instrument, i¸ as function of the expected values of the state 
variables of the economy,  and y:
4 One functional form often used in the recent literature, the linex function – see Nobay and Peel (2003) 
and Ruge-Murcia (2004) – behaves quite similarly to our threshold quadratic specification for realistic 
parameters, but results in a more complex Euler equation and could lead to empirical problems due to the 
limitations of the data sample. 
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Because of the persistence in the AS-AD system, the Euler equation has an infinite 
horizon, and thus cannot be used directly in empirical work. With this regard, we adopt 
the approach devised by Favero and Rovelli (2003), and truncate expression (5) at 4 
quarters ahead. This horizon seems realistic, in view of the ability of forecasting 
macroeconomic conditions by actual policymakers - see Aguiar and Martins (2005) for 
further discussions and sensitivity analysis. The specification proceeds with the 
expansion of the partial derivatives in (5) as functions of the relevant AS-AD 
coefficients in (1), in order to include the cross-equation restrictions that ensure that the 
minimization of the policymaker’s loss function is subject to the constraints given by 
the structure of the economy. The resulting expression, supplemented with an 
innovation for estimation purposes, is 
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(6)
Simultaneous estimation of the system of 3 equations composed of the AS-AD 
system (1) and the Euler equation (6), delivers the parameters describing the monetary 
policy regime and the AS-AD coefficients. Because expectations of future inflation, 
output gaps and interest rates are not available in the data, they are replaced by actual 
observations and, therefore, GMM are the appropriate estimators, assuming that the 
policymaker’s expectations errors are not correlated with the information available at 
the time of expectations formation. As regards the instrument set to form the 
orthogonality conditions, we follow Aguiar and Martins (2005) and use the second, 
third and fourth lags of all the system's variables as instruments, and base inference in a 
heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation-consistent variance-covariance matrix. 
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In order to cover the three types of asymmetry in the policymaker’s preferences 
identified in the literature, estimation is carried out sequentially allowing each of the 
loss function weights 
 , , and µ to vary with the state of the corresponding target 
variable, and then concludes with a joint test. Statistical inference is based on individual 
significance tests and Wald tests of the null hypothesis of no asymmetry. In agreement 
with standard practice in the literature, the weight 
 is restricted to 
=1 when not 
asymmetric; likewise, when 
 is allowed to be asymmetric, the sum ** ||   

 < ++ + tt
is restricted to equal 2, to keep consistency with the null of symmetry 
1|| ** == < ++   

 tt .
4. Results: the case of the Euro Area 
In this section we first describe the data and, then, conduct the tests for asymmetry in 
the monetary policymaker’s loss function and assess the results, including a comparison 
of the asymmetric preferences results with those of a standard quadratic central bank 
loss function. 
All data series are quarterly time-series for 1995:I-2005:II for the aggregate Euro 
Area. The source is the ECB, except for the output gap, which has been computed by 
the authors as described below. For 1995:I-2003:IV, the figures are those of the latest 
update of the ECB’s Area Wide Model Database (AWM12up5, available since 
September 2004), while for 2004:I-2005:II consistent updates have been obtained from 
the latest ECB’s monthly bulletin. 
The inflation rate is 100 times the difference of the log of quarterly GDP deflator 
to the same quarter in the previous year. It could be argued that, to agree with the ECB’s 
definition of price stability, the annualized inflation rate should be computed from the 
harmonized index of consumer prices (HICP), instead of our choice of the GDP 
deflator. But, because  must relate closely to both the policy decisions and, in the AS 
equation, to the output gap, the growth of the GDP deflator is more adequate than the 
HICP.5 In any case, the sample average of , 1.923 percent, is identical to the average of 
the analogous rate of growth of the HICP, and the volatility of HICP inflation is only 
slightly below that of .
5 This argument is, in fact, parallel to the reason that lies behind the standard use of a 3-month interest 
rate instead of a shorter money market rate, which would be closer to the actual policy instrument - the 
fact that i must, in this class of models, simultaneously play the role of policy instrument and connect 
closely to aggregate demand decisions. 
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The nominal short-term interest rate is the quarterly average of the 3-month 
interest rate Euribor, in percentage points. The proxy for exogenous supply shocks is the 
lagged difference between imported and domestic inflation, with imported inflation 
computed as 100 times the annual difference of the log of the Area’s imports deflator. 
The output gap, in percentage points, is the log difference between real GDP and a 
stochastic trend. 
The output gap has been estimated by the authors from a univariate unobservable 
components model of log real output, specifically a local linear trend model augmented 
with an autoregressive cycle. As the maximum likelihood estimate of the variance of the 
innovation to the stochastic drift in the trend is biased towards zero, we employ Stock 
and Watson’s (1998) procedure to obtain a median unbiased estimation of this variance, 
and then constrain the kalman filter estimation of the trend-cycle model accordingly.6
The output gap time-series is not given by the end-of-sample kalman smoother, but 
rather the updated one-step-ahead forecasts given directly by the kalman filter (see 
Harvey, 1989). This quasi real-time estimate, in comparison with the two-sided output 
gaps that have been used in the tests for asymmetry of policy preferences in previous 
literature, is conceptually closer to the information available to policymakers at the time 
of policy decisions.7
The framework for testing loss function asymmetry requires a pre-defined 
inflation target, *. In view of the definition of price stability by the ECB, reviewed 
above, a value of 2 percent for * is a consensual choice; this target has also been used, 
in the related literature, by Dolado et al. (2005) and by Surico (2003). 
Figure 1 shows, for the sample period, the data on the relevant arguments in the 
policymaker’s loss function, together with the corresponding desired values, which are 
the threshold levels in the asymmetry tests – 0 for y and i, and 2 for .
Table 1 summarizes the tests for each asymmetry - precautionary demand for 
expansions, precautionary demand for price stability and asymmetric interest rate 
smoothing – as well as the joint tests of these three type of asymmetries. In order to 
focus the analysis, we report only the loss function coefficients, and the corresponding 
 
6 Notice that the output gap is estimated with the whole available time-series of real output, 1970:I-
2005:II, even though only gaps for 1995:I-2005:II are used in the subsequent estimations in the paper. All 
data and replication files are available from the authors upon request, including the Gauss codes for 
computing the output gap. 
7 Our concept of quasi-real time output gap differs slightly from Orphanides and Van Norden’s (2002) 
homonym concept, in that even though the kalman filter’s one-step-ahead forecasts of trend output are 
computed from past data of output only, the filter uses the estimates for the UC model hyper-parameters 
that have been estimated using the whole sample. 
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test statistics, even though these have been obtained in a joint GMM estimation of the 
AS-AD-Euler system, as discussed in section 3, above. 
The table shows no sign of precautionary demand for expansions, as neither 
0| + ty , nor 0| <+ ty are statistically significant, nor the hypothesis that 
00 || < ++ =   tt yy can be rejected at conventional significance levels, irrespectively of 
modeling this type of asymmetry individually or jointly. 
Moreover, the evidence indicates that the output gap, y, is not a relevant argument 
in the Euro Area’s policymaker loss function, as  is statistically insignificant not only 
when some source of loss function asymmetry is allowed for, but also (results not 
reported) when the loss function is of the standard quadratic form. 
When, in accordance with this evidence, regimes of strict inflation targeting are 
adopted – restricting =0 – there is evidence in favor of the hypothesis of precautionary 
demand for price stability. In fact, the hypothesis that ** ||   

 < ++ = tt can be 
rejected at 1 percent of significance, and the estimates for *|  
 +t , 1.366, and 
*|  
 <+t , 0.634, mean that the monetary policymaker has weighted positive deviations 
of inflation from the target twice as much as negative deviations. 
The estimates of *|  
 +t and *|  
 <+t are unchanged when the asymmetry 
regarding the objective of price stability is combined with interest rate smoothing 
asymmetry (last line of table 1), and the p-value of the test for the hypothesis of 
precautionary demand for price stability is still at 1 percent. Regarding interest rate 
smoothing itself, there is no evidence in favor of this type of asymmetry throughout the 
entire table 1, as the hypothesis that 00 || < ++ =  µµ tt ii is never rejected at 
conventional significance levels. 
In short, during 1995:I-2005:II the policy actions of the Euro Area monetary 
policymaker reveal a regime of strict inflation targeting with interest rate smoothing and 
a precautionary demand for price stability.8 In contrast with Surico’s (2003) inference of 
a precautionary demand for expansions, this revealed asymmetry is consistent with the 
ECB’s definition of price stability and with the priority of credibility-building by a 
recently created monetary authority.9
8 The asymmetry tests results have proven to be robust to a cross-check (not reported here) consisting of 
testing for asymmetry in each loss function coefficient using as threshold variable all possible alternative 
target-variables in the loss function. 
9 The disparity between our results and Surico’s - which is beyond the scope of this paper to scrutinize -  
could result from differences in the model as well as in data: Surico (2003) uses a different sample and 
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Table 2 presents complete estimates of the selected model, in the upper panel, 
together with those of the parallel model with standard quadratic policy preferences, in 
the lower panel. The case of flexible inflation targeting –  not restricted to 0 - has not 
been selected because of the insignificance of  found above (also found by Aguiar and 
Martins, 2005, with an alternative measure of the output gap). 
The 1.837 percent inflation target estimated in the symmetric model, with a 95 
percent confidence interval of [1.75, 1.92], is consistent with the downward bias relative 
to 2 percent in the asymmetric preferences model. The results in the table also suggest 
that the asymmetry in the loss function does not influence the AS-AD coefficients, 
which are estimated with the expected signs, reasonable magnitudes and good precision, 
and are remarkably similar across the two specifications (symmetric and asymmetric) of 
policy-maker’s preferences. The converse remains to be assessed – if different AS-AD 
specifications interfere with the asymmetry of the loss function. This is one of the 
sensitivity checks to be conducted next. 
 
5. Sensitivity checks 
This section reports some sensitivity exercises to which we have submitted the results, 
concerning (i) the beginning date of the sample; (ii) the truncation of the Euler equation; 
(iii) exclusion of interest rate smoothing from the central bank’s loss function; (iv) an 
alternative output gap; and (v) variants of the AS-AD structure. 
 
Sensitivity to the date of emergence of the monetary policy regime 
In view of the non-institutional basis for identification, by Aguiar and Martins (2005), 
of 1995:I as the beginning date of the Euro Area notional policy regime, we now check 
the sensitivity of the tests for asymmetry to changes in the start of the sample period. 
Table 3 shows, for selected samples beginning at 1996:I, 1997:I and 1998:I, the 
results of the tests of the hypothesis of precautionary demand for price stability (results 
regarding the significance of the output gap, not reported for space conservation, are 
entirely consistent with those in Table 1). The check does not proceed after 1998:I due 
to the reduced number of observations. Yet, from the 30 observations in this last sample 
only the first 4 are pre-EMU quarters, so that the results may be considered an 
approximation to a test of asymmetric policy preferences in the EMU. 
 
periodicity (monthly data 1997:7-2002:10), a different computation of the output gap (two-sided Hodrick-
Prescott-filter of industrial production) and a different structural macro model (purely forward-looking 
AS-AD model without any policy lags).  
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Overall, the estimates of the weights attached by the policy-maker to positive and 
negative deviations of inflation from 2 percent are remarkably consistent with those 
obtained from the full sample, and the hypothesis of no precautionary demand for price 
stability can be rejected at standard confidence levels. 
 
Sensitivity to truncation of Euler equation 
Since the Euler equation used in estimation is a finite approximation to the infinite 
terms’ equation (5), we now inspect the robustness of the asymmetry tests results to 
larger forecast horizons of the policy-maker. 
Table 4 reports the results of the relevant tests - precautionary demand for price 
stability in strict inflation targeting regimes - for truncations at 5 and 6 quarters ahead - 
i.e. =5, and =6 in equation (5). Even though policy-makers may possibly set interest 
rates reacting to output gaps and inflation forecasted up until more than one and a half 
years ahead, further extension of the Euler equation is problematic because of the 
number and nonlinear combinations of parameters involved (Favero and Rovelli, 2003), 
which is particularly critical in the case of small samples. 
Clearly, the table shows that the evidence in favour of a precautionary demand for 
price stability in the Euro Area, reported in table 1, is robust to expanding the policy-
maker’s forecast horizon up to one and a half years.10 
Sensitivity to inflation targeting without interest rate smoothing 
While the ex-ante inclusion of interest rate smoothing as a policy goal in the policy-
maker’s loss function is standard in empirical studies, as it is needed for a suitable 
replication of the inertia observed in interest rates, it could be argued that this may be a 
result of the assumed macroeconomic structure rather than a policy objective by itself. 
Hence, we now check whether the asymmetry tests results are sensitive to the exclusion 
of interest rate smoothing from the policymaker’s loss function. 
Table 5 reveals that under the restriction µ=0 there is still no evidence allowing 
for rejection of the null hypothesis of no precautionary demand for expansions, while, in 
contrast, the hypothesis of no precautionary demand for price stability is again rejected 
at standard confidence levels. Consistently with our previous results, the detection of 
asymmetric inflation preferences appears clearly in the regime of strict inflation 
targeting, which is favored by the data against the flexible inflation targeting regime. 
 
10 Allowing also for asymmetry in the preferences regarding the output gap - results not reported for space 
conservation - does not change the statistical evidence in favour of a precautionary demand for price 
stability. 
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Sensitivity to an alternative measure of the Output Gap 
As explained above, our output gap measure is the kalman filter estimate of a univariate 
structural time series model of log real output. We have labelled this gap a quasi-real 
time output gap, in the sense that it results from a one-sided univariate filter of real 
output (conditional on the whole sample estimates of the model hyper-parameters), and 
have argued that it may be closer to the actual information available to policy-makers 
when setting interest rates than the standard two-sided filters. We now check whether 
results would change substantially with a two-sided and perhaps more conventional 
measure of the output cycle - the deviation of log real output from its Hodrick-Prescott 
filter trend. 
As Table 6 shows, the results are entirely consistent with the baseline results 
reported in Table 1. First, there is no evidence of asymmetry in the preferences for 
interest rate smoothing and no evidence of precautionary demand for expansions; 
second, there is evidence of precautionary demand for price stability at very low 
significance levels, irrespective of the restrictions that are imposed on the other 
arguments of the policy-maker’s loss function. The estimates of the policy-maker’s loss 
function weights on inflation rates above 2 percent range from 1.353 to 1.493 (weights 
on inflation rates below 2 percent range from 0.647 to 0.507), which is in line with the 
estimates of table 1. 
 
Sensitivity to variants of the AS-AD structure 
The aggregate demand-aggregate supply structure (1) has been identified empirically, 
with Euro Area data including a quasi-real time output gap, starting out from the 
Rudebusch and Svensson (1999, 2002) model of the US economy. Although rooted in 
this benchmark, system (1) deviates from it in two main features. First, in the AS 
equation, inflation is explained by contemporaneous rather than lagged output gap. 
Second, in the AD equation, the output gap is explained by a third lag of the real interest 
rate, rather than a real rate computed as its average during the previous four quarters. 
We now check if results of the asymmetry tests are robust to alternative lag-
structures of the AD and AS equations.11 Specifically, we vary the lag of the real 
 
11 Our framework would also allow for a joint test of the hypothesis of asymmetry in the policy-maker’s 
preferences and of nonlinearity in the aggregate-supply equation. However, succeeding in such an 
econometric task with GMM estimation requires far more data than is currently available for meaningful 
analysis of aggregate Euro-Area policy-making, and thus we defer such exercise for future research. 
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interest rate in the AD equation from one through four quarters, and the lag of the 
output gap from zero to one quarter, thus encompassing the whole range of lags of the 
Rudebusch-Svensson structure. Results are summed-up in table 7, including the 
Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) US-economy specification in the last four lines. 
Table 7 confirms that there is no evidence of asymmetry between interest rate 
increases and declines. In what regards deviations of output from its trend, there is also 
no statistical evidence of asymmetry, neither precautionary demand for expansions nor 
contractions. 
The table shows that the estimates of the policy-maker’s loss function weights on 
positive deviations of inflation from the target are always larger than the weights on 
negative deviations, consistently with the results in the baseline model. These weights 
range, respectively, from 1.322 to 1.718, and from 0.678 to 0.282. Across the eight 
alternative AS-AD systems, there is always 1-percent significant evidence of 
precautionary demand for price stability, so long as the loss function is specified as a 
strict inflation targeting regime. When the policy-maker’s preferences are allowed to 
include directly an output stabilisation objective, the evidence of precautionary demand 
for price stability remains 10-percent significant in six out of the eight alternative 
systems, and in all cases the estimates of the inflation weights hardly change. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
This paper has tested for asymmetries in the preferences of the aggregate Euro Area 
monetary policymaker, looking at deviations from the standard quadratic loss function 
that have been suggested in recent literature - precautionary demand for expansions, 
precautionary demand for price stability, and interest rate smoothing asymmetry. 
The results obtained reject flexible inflation targeting in favor of strict inflation 
targeting, which corroborates previous evidence that we have obtained under symmetry. 
As to the specific purpose of this paper, there is evidence that the Euro-Area monetary 
policymaker has revealed a precautionary demand for price stability throughout 1995-
2005, weighting deviations of inflation above 2 percent twice as much as deviations 
below 2 percent. This type of asymmetry is consistent with the ECB’s definition of 
price stability and with the priority of credibility-building by a recently created 
monetary authority. 
The evidence of precautionary demand for price stability has proved to be robust 
to several variations in the empirical framework. This type of asymmetry persists under 
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a conventional (Hodrick-Prescott filter based) measure of the output gap, and under 
variants of the aggregate demand-aggregate supply structure of the Rudebusch-
Svensson class, including the system specified by these authors for the US economy. 
Moreover, the evidence of precautionary demand for price stability holds out in samples 
beginning as late as 1998:I, which is very close to the EMU years. Yet, this evidence 
should be put to the test once enough new data allow for the estimation of strictly post-
1999 monetary policy preferences with acceptable degrees of freedom. 
Future empirical research on the Euro Area case, when enough data on the Area 
policy regime and macro structure becomes available, should also test simultaneously 
for asymmetries in the policy-maker’s preferences and for nonlinearity of the AS 
relation, and experiment with hybrid forward and backward-looking AS-AD equations 
to model the macro structure of the Area. 
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Figure 1. Loss Function Variables
Euro Area 1995:I-2005:II
Output Gap 
Inflation
Interest rate changes
Data sources: Area Wide Model Database AWM12up5, ECB August 2004 (1995:I-2003:IV), ECB 
Monthly Bulletin (2004:I – 2005:II), and authors’ calculations.
Notes: - Output gap is the cycle from an univariate unobserved components model (local linear 
trend model with autoregressive cycle) of log real GDP 1970:I-2005:II, estimated with the 
kalman filter with Stock and Watson’s (1998) median unbiased estimation of the variance of 
the trend stochastic drift;
- Inflation = 100*ln(P
 t/Pt-4), where P is the GDP deflator;
- Interest Rate changes = i
 t-it-1 , where i is the 3-month interest rate;
- Dotted lines represent the policy targets;
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
1995Q1 1996Q1 1997Q1 1998Q1 1999Q1 2000Q1 2001Q1 2002Q1 2003Q1 2004Q1 2005Q1
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
1995Q1 1996Q1 1997Q1 1998Q1 1999Q1 2000Q1 2001Q1 2002Q1 2003Q1 2004Q1 2005Q1
-1.0
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1995Q1 1996Q1 1997Q1 1998Q1 1999Q1 2000Q1 2001Q1 2002Q1 2003Q1 2004Q1 2005Q1
Page 23 of 29
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
Table 1. Tests for Asymmetries in the Preferences of the Monetary Policymaker
Euro Area 1995:I – 2005:II
Notes: - Joint estimation by GMM of system (1) and equation (6) with the appropriate restrictions, with * = 2 and  = 0.975 (AS-AD coefficients not shown);
- GMM estimation with one-step weighting matrix, fully iterated parameters, HAC variance-covariance matrix, Bartlett kernel, Andrews bandwidth;
- Instruments: constant, t-i, yt-i, it-i, It-i,   i=2, 3, 4;
- The test statistics in the last three columns are Wald statistics for the indicated null hypothesis. 
Asymmetry in Output Gap 1.0 -0.133 -0.131 0.002
     Targeting (0.238) (0.073) (0.000)
Asymmetry in Inflation 1.164 0.836 -0.107 0.002
    Targeting (0.000) (0.000) (0.158) (0.000)
1.366 0.634 0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Asymmetry in Interest 1.0 -0.124 0.002 0.002
     Rate Smoothing (0.086) (0.080) (0.004)
1.0 0.003 0.002
(0.067) (0.033)
Joint asymmetries 1.324 0.676 -0.190 -0.073 0.002 0.002
(0.000) (0.002) (0.139) (0.247) (0.082) (0.007)
1.370 0.630 0.003 0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.138) (0.031)
(0.725)
| 2 = |  <2
0.002
(0.967)
0.124
(P-values)
Parameter Estimates 
(P-values)
Test Statistics 
0.223
(0.637)
µ|  i  0 = µ|  i<0
2.227
(0.136)
6.635
| y  0 = | y<0
0.001
(0.980)
0.862
1.227
(0.268)
0.043
(0.836)
| 2 |< 2
(0.010)
(0.353)
10.519
(0.001)
µ µ| i  0 µ| i < 0 | y < 0 | y  0
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Table 2. Macroeconomic Structure and Asymmetric vs Symmetric 
Policymaker’s Preferences
Euro Area 1995:I – 2005:II
Notes: - Upper panel: joint estimation by GMM of system (1) and equation (6) with =0, µ constant, 
* = 2 and  = 0.975;
- Lower panel: joint estimation by GMM of system (1) and equation (6) with =0,  and µ
constant and  = 0.975;
- GMM estimation with one-step weighting matrix, fully iterated parameters, HAC variance-
covariance matrix, Bartlett kernel, Andrews bandwidth;
- Instruments: constant, t-i, yt-i, it-i, It-i,   i=2, 3, 4;
- P-values in parenthesis.
Strict Inflation Targeting 
with Interest Rate Smoothing
and Precautionary Demand for Price Stability
AD c1 c2 c3 c4 
(AD)
1.348 -0.251 -0.150 -0.006 0.107
(0.000) (0.222) (0.166) (0.018)
AS c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 
(AS)
0.917 -0.076 0.516 0.117 0.032 0.242
(0.000) (0.46027) (0.000) (0.020) (0.000)
CB Loss  |  2 |< 2 µ 
(IR)
2.000 1.366 0.634 0.0019 0.001
-- (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Strict Inflation Targeting 
with Interest Rate Smoothing
AD c1 c2 c3 c4 
(AD)
1.350 -0.252 -0.150 -0.006 0.107
(0.000) (0.172) (0.128) (0.021)
AS c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 
(AS)
0.926 -0.094 0.520 0.115 0.032 0.242
(0.000) (0.397) (0.000) (0.022) (0.000)
CB Loss    µ 
(IR)
1.837 1.000 -- 0.0020 0.001
(0.000) --- -- (0.000)
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Table 3. Sensitivity to Beginning Date of the Notional Monetary Policy 
Regime in the Euro Area
Notes: - Joint estimation by GMM of system (1) and equation (6) with the appropriate restrictions, with 
* = 2 and  = 0.975 (AS-AD coefficients not shown);
- GMM estimation with one-step weighting matrix, fully iterated parameters, HAC variance-
covariance matrix, Bartlett kernel, Andrews bandwidth;
- Instruments: constant, t-i, yt-i, it-i, It-i,   i=2, 3, 4;
- The test statistics in the last two columns are Wald statistics (and p-values) for the indicated null 
hypothesis.
Asymmetry in Inflation
    Targeting
1996:I - 2005:II 1.344 0.656 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004)
1997:I - 2005:II 1.337 0.663 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.107)
1998:I - 2005:II 1.379 0.621 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.008)
Asymmetry in Inflation
    Targeting and in
    Interest Rate Smoothing
1996:I - 2005:II 1.411 0.589 0.002 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.022) (0.056)
1997:I - 2005:II 1.402 0.598 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.006) (0.112) (0.411)
1998:I - 2005:II 1.413 0.587 0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.293)
7.444
(0.006)
2.947
(0.086)
| 2 = |  <2
(P-values)
Parameter Estimates
(P-values)
Test Statistics 
1.028
(0.311)
µ|  i  0 = µ|  i<0
3.459
(0.063)
9.492
6.588
0.548
(0.459)
(0.200)
1.640
| 2 |< 2
(0.002)
(0.010)
9.043
(0.003)
µ µ| i  0 µ| i < 0
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Table 4. Sensitivity to Longer Horizons in the Euler equation
Euro Area 1995:I – 2005:II 
Notes: - See notes to table 3.
Asymmetry in Inflation
    Targeting
=5 1.420 0.580 0.003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
=6 1.512 0.488 0.001
(0.000) (0.010) (0.105)
Asymmetry in Inflation
    Targeting and in
    Interest Rate Smoothing
=5 1.439 0.561 0.005 0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.048) (0.046)
=6 1.512 0.488 0.002 0.001
(0.000) (0.030) (0.463) (0.522)
µ|  i  0 = µ|  i<0| 2 = |  <2| 2 |< 2
(0.000)
µ µ| i  0 µ| i < 0
5.166
(0.023)
14.951
0.158
(0.692)
(0.385)
(P-values)
Parameter Estimates
(P-values)
Test Statistics 
10.272
(0.001)
7.508
(0.006)
0.754
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Table 5. Sensitivity to Policymakers’ Loss Function without Interest Rate Smoothing 
Euro Area 1995:I – 2005:II
Notes: - See notes to table 3.
Asymmetry in Inflation 1.454 0.546
    Targeting (0.000) (0.000)
1.292 0.708 -0.119
(0.000) (0.000) (0.070)
Asymmetry in Output Gap 1.0 -0.097 -0.201
     Targeting (0.462) (0.015)
0.000 0.000
(0.139) (0.146)
Asymmetry in Inflation 1.397 0.603 -0.216 -0.105
    and Output Gap (0.000) (0.006) (0.174) (0.075)
    Targeting
(0.136)
(0.073) (0.421)
0.927
(0.336)
| 2 |< 2
(0.117)
 | y < 0
3.225
2.452
 | y  0
0.646
(P-values)
Parameter Estimates 
(P-values)
Test Statistics 
| 2 = |  <2
12.477
(0.000)
2.221
| y  0 = | y<0
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Table 6. Sensitivity to Hodrick-Prescott filter Output Gap 
Euro Area 1995:I – 2005:II
Notes: - See notes to table 3.
Asymmetry in Output Gap 1.0 0.005 -0.028 0.001
     Targeting (0.426) (0.199) (0.000)
Asymmetry in Inflation 1.430 0.570 -0.012 0.001
    Targeting (0.000) (0.000) (0.211) (0.000)
1.463 0.537 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
Asymmetry in Interest 1.0 -0.007 0.001 0.001
     Rate Smoothing (0.5073) (0.3866) (0.005)
1.0 0.001 0.001
(0.231) (0.056)
Joint asymmetries 1.353 0.647 -0.004 -0.015 0.002 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.540) (0.242) (0.004) (0.006)
1.493 0.507 0.002 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.024)
 | y < 0 | y  0| 2 |< 2
(0.000)
(0.000)
24.862
(0.000)
µ µ| i  0 µ| i < 0
0.829
(0.363)
2.181
(0.140)
2.022
(0.155)
µ|  i  0 = µ|  i<0
5.180
(0.023)
27.260
| y  0 = | y<0
1.847
(0.174)
19.237
(P-values)
Parameter Estimates 
(P-values)
Test Statistics 
(0.915)
| 2 = |  <2
0.205
(0.650)
0.011
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Table 7. Sensitivity to alternative lags in AS-AD structure
Euro Area 1995:I – 2005:II
Notes: - Joint estimation by GMM of the indicated AS-AD system and the corresponding Euler equation, 
with appropriate restrictions, for alternative Loss asymmetry tests, given * = 2 and  = 0.975;
- The parenthesis in the first column (AS-AD), indicate the lag of the explanatory variable, ie
AD(2) means that the AD includes a second lag of the real interest rate, AS(1) means that the AS 
has a one-quarter lagged output gap; 
- The loss function specifications indicated in the second column correspond to tests of the 
following asymmetries: (i) asymmetry in inflation targeting; (ii) asymmetry in inflation targeting 
and in interest rate smoothing (iii) asymmetry in inflation targeting and in output gap targeting; (iv) 
asymmetry in inflation targeting, in output gap targeting and in interest rate smoothing; (i) and (ii) 
are regimes of strict inflation targeting with interest rate smoothing, while (iii) and (iv) are regimes 
of flexible inflation targeting with interest rate smoothing;
- GMM estimation with one-step weighting matrix, fully iterated parameters, HAC variance-
covariance matrix, Bartlett kernel, Andrews bandwidth;  Instruments: constant, t-i, yt-i, it-i, It-i 
i=2, 3, 4;
AD(3)-AS(1) (i) 1.446 0.554
(ii) 1.458 0.542
(iii) 1.545 0.455
(iv) 1.513 0.487
AD(1)-AS(0) (i) 1.388 0.612
(ii) 1.388 0.612
(iii) 1.409 0.591
(iv) 1.413 0.587
AD(1)-AS(1) (i) 1.391 0.609
(ii) 1.404 0.596
(iii) 1.635 0.365
(iv) 1.633 0.367
AD(2)-AS(0) (i) 1.322 0.678
(ii) 1.325 0.675
(iii) 1.404 0.596
(iv) 1.396 0.604
AD(2)-AS(1) (i) 1.417 0.583
(ii) 1.437 0.563
(iii) 1.413 0.587
(iv) 1.413 0.587
AD(4)-AS(0) (i) 1.447 0.553
(ii) 1.480 0.520
(iii) 1.476 0.524
(iv) 1.449 0.551
AD(4)-AS(1) (i) 1.661 0.339
(ii) 1.701 0.299
(iii) 1.718 0.282
(iv) 1.675 0.325
AD(1,2,3,4), (i) 1.479 0.521
AS(1) (ii) 1.508 0.492
(iii) 1.367 0.633
(iv) 1.393 0.607
Estimates P-values of Wald Statistics 
AS-AD  
structure µ|  i  0 = µ|  i<0| 2 |< 2
CB Loss 
Function | 2 = |  <2
0.841
| y  0 = | y<0
0.000
0.001
0.000
0.001
0.865
0.198
0.936
0.023
0.038
0.000
0.003 0.304
0.112
0.122
0.212 0.491
0.489 0.956
0.445
0.014 0.140
0.146
0.003
0.013
0.705
0.148 0.294
0.012
0.300 0.896
0.000
0.130
0.380
0.095 0.184
0.001
0.195 0.804
0.000
0.087
0.314
0.068 0.126
0.001
0.079 0.139 0.978
0.008
0.008 0.057
0.000 0.119
0.001 0.153 0.809
0.000
0.001 0.300
0.022 0.299
0.010 0.336 0.228
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